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The Directors' and Officers' Insurance Premium:
An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance

Using a sample of D&O premiums gathered from the proxy statements of
Canadian companies, this article examines the D&O premium as a measure of ex ante
litigation risk. I find a significant association between D&O premiums and variables that
proxy for the quality of firms' governance structures. The association between the proxies
for governance structure quality and D&O premiums is robust to a number of alternative
specifications. This article provides confirmatory evidence that the D&O premium
reflects the quality of the firm's corporate governance by showing that measures of weak
governance implied by the D&O premium are positively related to excess CEO
compensation. The overall results suggest that D&O premiums contain useful
information about the quality of firms' governance.
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1.

Introduction
Does corporate governance matter? Do shareholders sue more frequently when a

firm has a weaker governance structure? Romano (1991) finds some evidence of an
association between governance structure and ex post litigation risk. In this article, I use
the directors' and officers' insurance (D&O) premium as a measure of ex ante litigation
risk, and examine whether there is detectable variation in the premium associated with
proxies for the quality of firms' corporate governance.
D&O insurance covers the monetary costs of lawsuits against directors and
officers by shareholders or third-parties. The insurance provides coverage if the claim is
settled with no admission of bad faith by a director or officer, or, if the suit is taken to
trial, there is no finding of bad faith by the court. The D&O insurer is an expert in
assessing D&O litigation risk, which is the probability the firm will be sued multiplied by
the expected cost of a suit. The D&O insurer sets a premium equal to its assessment of
the firm's litigation risk plus a mark-up for its overhead and profit.
I hypothesize that the D&O insurance premium reflects both business risk and the
quality of the firm's governance structure. Consistent with most prior research, I
characterize the quality of a firm's governance structure from the perspective of the
outside shareholders: the governance structure is strong (weak) if it allows shareholders
to impose tight (loose) constraints on managers' actions.1 I hypothesize that a firm with
weaker governance has greater litigation risk because there is a greater chance that the
managers will act against the interests of shareholders. Provided that the insurer cannot
refuse to cover all claims related to weak governance, the insurance will be priced to
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reflect not only the firm’s business risk but also the quality of the firm’s governance
structure.
My sample consists of a cross-section of publicly-traded Canadian firms with
1993 and 1994 fiscal year-ends. I select Canadian firms because they are required to
disclose whether they purchased D&O insurance and the details of the policies (Alboini,
1993). The corporate governance and legal systems in Canada are in general similar to
those in the U.S. with two major differences. First, dual-class share structures continue to
be common in Canada, and ownership is more concentrated (Rao and Lee-Sing, 1995).
Second, during the sample period, the Canadian legal system was less conducive to
"nuisance" suits over stock price declines, suits that often have no merit but are settled
regularly (Alexander, 1991).2
I find that D&O premiums are higher for firms with weaker governance
structures. Variables that proxy for the quality of the governance structure are significant
determinants of variation in the premium in regressions that include controls for business
risk (such as firm size, financial performance, and U.S. exchange listing). The results
indicate that D&O premiums are significantly higher when inside control of share votes is
greater, when inside ownership is lower, when the board is comprised of fewer outside
directors, when the CEO has appointed more of the outside directors, and when inside
officers have employment contracts. In addition, consistent with Romano (1991), the
results indicate that a disclosure of any type of pending or prior litigation significantly
increases D&O premiums.
I validate the assessment of governance structure quality contained in the D&O

Core 5

premium by showing that excess CEO compensation is significantly higher for firms that
have high D&O premiums relative to their business risk. This result provides
confirmatory evidence that the D&O premium is higher when the insurer has determined
that the firm's governance structure is weaker. The combination of this evidence with
previous research that has linked excess CEO compensation to poor subsequent
performance (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) provides indirect evidence that the
measure of weak governance contained in the D&O premium captures features of firms'
governance that make shareholders worse off. These results also suggest that the
information contained in the D&O premium is a useful summary measure of the quality
of a firm's governance.
The following section describes the institutional features of D&O insurance, and
develops a hypothesis and econometric model for the D&O premium based on these
features. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis of D&O
premiums, and Section 5 concludes.
2.

Governance structure quality and the D&O insurance premium

2.1

Hypothesis Development
In both Canada and the U.S., roughly one-half of D&O claims are brought by

shareholders (the remainder by employees, customers, competitors, regulators, and other
third-parties).3 Although shareholder lawsuits related to inadequate disclosure (many of
which are nuisance or "strike" suits by attorneys who specialize in filing suits following
stock price drops) are the focus of much debate about D&O lawsuits, these claims
represent less than half of shareholder claims. Shareholders also sue when they believe
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D&Os have not met their fiduciary duty. Examples of causes for these suits include
acquisitions by the firm, bids by others to take over the firm, bankruptcy, executive
compensation, and other self-interested transactions (Wyatt, 1993).
D&O insurance covers the monetary costs of settling and defending these
lawsuits. The insurance covers D&Os provided that the claim did not result from their
failure to act “honestly and in good faith," which means that the D&Os did not violate
their fiduciary duty to put the firm's interests ahead of their self-interest. For the purposes
of determining whether a suit is covered by the insurance, D&Os are assumed to have
acted in good faith if the suit is settled out of court with no admission of bad faith, or, if
the suit is taken to trial, there is no finding of bad faith. This bad faith exclusion in D&O
insurance gives officers and directors strong incentives to settle a suit without trial,
because attorneys representing shareholders usually prefer to settle, and do not require an
admission of bad faith as a condition of settlement. Likewise, a D&O insurer settles
many claims of questionable merit. The insurer settles these claims to avoid the potential
that it could be required to pay damages above the policy limit if it refuses a good faith
settlement offer (Alexander, 1991). Thus, although the insurer can successfully refuse to
pay a claim for which there is incontrovertible evidence of management’s failure to act in
good faith, the insurer will settle a claim that arises from management opportunism that is
apparent but too costly to verify.
The annual premium paid for a D&O policy covers claims made in the year of
coverage up to the annual policy limit and subject to any deductible. A typical D&O
policy combines two types of insurance coverage: (1) corporate coverage, which
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reimburses the firm when it indemnifies D&Os for the costs of a suit; and (2) personal
coverage, which provides direct payments to D&Os when the firm is not able or
unwilling to indemnify them.4 The personal and corporate coverage limits are typically
the same. The corporate coverage portion carries a significant deductible (that averages
approximately 2% of the limit), and the personal coverage portion carries a trivial
deductible (usually zero). D&O limits are stated on an annual basis for all covered losses
during the policy year.5
The D&O insurance application process is structured to enable the insurer to
obtain full information about the applicant’s risk factors at a negligible cost. When a firm
initially applies for D&O insurance, it must submit an extensive written application
which details the firm's past litigation experience, its past and future business activities,
biographical data on its directors and officers, and its ownership structure (Holderness,
1990; Knepper and Bailey, 1993). On its annual renewal, the firm must state any change
in its circumstances since its initial application. In addition to reviewing the application
form, the D&O insurer conducts background checks of the firm's management, and may
also interview management. If the firm withholds any information relevant to its
litigation risk, the insurer can use this omission to deny coverage in the event of a claim
(Doyle, 1991). These features of the application process suggest that the insurer and the
firm share similar beliefs about the firm's litigation risk at the time the insurance is
priced. 6
The null hypothesis is that that the D&O insurance premium reflects only the
firm's business risk. My alternative hypothesis is that the premium also reflects the
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insurer's assessment of the quality of the firm's governance structure. A sufficient
condition for the quality of corporate governance to be priced in the D&O premium is
that the quality of governance structures varies in cross-section for otherwise identical
firms and that it is too costly for the insurer to exclude all claims arising from weak
corporate governance.7 As stated above, I characterize the quality of a firm's governance
structure from the perspective of the outside shareholders: the governance structure is
strong (weak) if it allows shareholders to impose tight (loose) constraints on managers'
actions. A firm with weaker governance has greater litigation risk because the manager
of such a firm is more likely to take an action which is subsequently revealed to be
inconsistent with the shareholders’ interests. Business risk (such as firm size,
profitability, and relative exposure to the U.S. legal system) also increases litigation risk.
Thus, a firm's D&O premium is hypothesized to be a function of both the quality of its
corporate governance and its business risk:
D&O premium = f(governance structure quality, business risk)
2.2

(1)

Econometric model
This section develops an econometric model for the D&O premium based on

institutional features of D&O insurance pricing and on the following two assumptions.
First, consistent with the application process described above, I assume that the firm and
insurer have symmetric beliefs about the probability and distribution of D&O losses.
Second, I assume that the D&O insurance market is perfectly competitive, which is
consistent with the market for D&O insurance during the sample period.8 In a
competitive insurance market with symmetric information, any firm may purchase D&O
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insurance and may choose the amount of limit it desires, and is charged a premium equal
to its litigation risk plus a mark-up.9
After the firm has completed the application process and has chosen a limit and
deductible, the insurer sets a premium by adjusting the ratebook premium for that limit
and deductible to reflect the difference in that firm's risk from the average risk. The
firm's premium can be modeled as the product of the insurer's overhead-and-profit factor,
the idiosyncratic litigation risk associated with this firm, and the ratebook conditional
expected loss (which is a function of the limit and deductible). Because the premium is
the product of these terms, the logarithm of the premium is linear in the firm's litigation
risk, the conditional expected loss, and a constant:
log(premium) = E0 + E1 litigation risk +
E3 log(E[ratebook loss|limit,deductible]) + H1

(2)

Because the conditional expected loss, log(E[ratebook loss|limit,deductible]), is
unobservable, I use the logarithm of the limit as a proxy:10
log(premium) = E0 + E1 litigation risk + E3 log(limit) + H1

(3)

Based on the hypothesis above, a firm’s litigation risk is a function of the quality of its
corporate governance and its business risk:
log(premium) = E0 + E1 governance structure quality + E2 business risk +
(4)
E3 log(limit) + H1
Because higher risk firms have greater expected losses, they purchase greater limits
(Wyatt, 1993; Core, 1997). Thus, the limit (and the conditional expected loss) is also a
function of governance structure quality and business risk:
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log(limit) = J0+ J1 governance structure quality + J2 business risk + H2

(5)

Note that log(premium) does not enter equation (5). Log(premium) reflects the average
cost of coverage to the firm, and does not affect the firm's choice of the limit, which is a
function of the marginal costs and benefits of coverage.11 Substituting equation (5) into
equation (4) yields the following reduced-form regression model for the D&O premium:
log(premium) = G0 + G1 governance structure quality + G2 business risk + E3 H2+ H1
(6)
where the total effect, Gi = Ei + E3 Ji, is the sum of the direct effect, Ei, of the variable on
log(premium) and its indirect effect by increasing log(limit), E3 Ji.
Consistent estimates of this reduced-form model are obtained under the standard
assumption that the governance structure and business risk variables are uncorrelated with
H1 and H2. A necessary condition for this assumption to hold is that the governance
structure and business risk variables are exogenous or predetermined at the time of the
insurance pricing decision. This assumption is consistent with the assumption of
symmetric information insurance contracting in which a firm can buy any limit it wishes,
and it is charged a premium based on its loss probability and its conditional expected
loss.12
3.

The Data
The initial sample consists of a cross-section of 246 firms with fiscal years ending

between June 1, 1993 and May 31, 1994.13 From this initial sample, a sub-sample of 110
firms is used in the analysis of D&O premiums, and a sub-sample of 208 firms is used in
the confirmatory analysis using excess CEO compensation (described below in Section

Core 11

4.4). The sub-sample of 110 firms for the D&O premium analysis was obtained by
eliminating 136 firms for the following reasons: (1) firm does not carry D&O insurance
(84 firms); (2) D&O insurance is provided by firm's parent (23 firms); (3) premium data
not disclosed or disclosed for only part of the D&O coverage (26 firms); and (4) data
missing for explanatory variables (3 firms).14
I gather data on the logarithm of the D&O insurance premium and limit, and
create proxy variables for governance structure quality and business risk. Data on the
D&O insurance policy and on the governance structure were gathered from the company's
proxy statement. The next sub-section discusses nine characteristics of corporate
governance that previous research has found to be related to variation in agency costs.
The second sub-section develops a set of control variables for business risk. These
variables were created using the company's annual report, the Canadian Compustat tapes,
and stock price data obtained from the Toronto Stock Exchange. All independent
variables used in the analysis of the D&O premium are measured as of the end of the
fiscal year prior to the proxy disclosure of the purchase of D&O insurance, under the
assumption that the insurance was purchased at the beginning of the most recent fiscal
year. Definitions of the variables, their predicted effect on the premium, and descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 1. All dollar amounts reported in this article are
denominated in Canadian dollars.15
Place Table 1 Here
3.1

Proxies for governance structure quality
Firms with weaker governance are hypothesized to have higher D&O premiums.
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To proxy for the quality of the firm's governance structure, I use three measures of
ownership structure, three measures of board independence, and three measures of
management entrenchment.
Prior research suggests that corporate governance is stronger when insiders own
more stock and when there is monitoring by outside blockholders, and that corporate
governance is weaker when insiders have greater voting control. Ownership of the firm's
shares by its managers has countervailing effects: an incentive alignment effect that
increases with the percentage of share value owned by the managers (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) and an entrenchment effect that increases with the percentage of share
votes controlled by the manager (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Stulz, 1988).
Consistent with an entrenchment effect of share votes in dual-class firms, Eckbo and
Verma (1994) find for a sample of Canadian firms that dividends decrease as inside
voting control increases. Concentrated ownership of shares by outside shareholders
increases the incentive to monitor and mitigates free-rider problems (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986).
I measure inside voting control (INS_VOTE) as the percentage of share votes
controlled by inside directors, and inside ownership (INS_VALUE) as the percentage of
share value owned by inside directors.16 Because my Canadian sample contains a
substantial proportion (approximately one-third) of firms with multiple classes of stock,
the variables INS_VOTE and INS_VALUE are empirically distinct. I measure ownership
by outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK) with a dummy variable equal to one if an
outside blockholder owns 10% of the firm, and zero otherwise.17
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Corporate governance is expected to be stronger when the board is independent of
the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Board independence is predicted to be positively related to the
percentage of outside directors and negatively related to the percentage of outside
directors appointed by the CEO and to whether the CEO is board chair. Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney (1996) find that firms censured by the SEC for fraudulent reporting have
fewer outside directors and are more likely to have a CEO who is also board chair.18
Prior research predicts and finds a negative relation between proxies for governance
structure quality and the percentage of the outside directors appointed by the CEO
(DIR_APP). Wade, O'Reilly and Chandratat (1990) document a positive association
between DIR_APP and the adoption of golden parachutes, and Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999) document a positive association between DIR_APP and excess CEO
compensation. The variable outside directors (DIR_OUT) is the number of outside
directors as a percentage of total directors.19 DIR_APP is the percentage of outside
directors who were appointed since the CEO joined the board. CEO_COB is a dummy
variable equal to one if the CEO is also board chair, and zero otherwise.
Top executive employment contracts are expected to weaken governance by
entrenching managers, but this entrenchment effect is expected to be lower when golden
parachutes are attached to the contracts. Although the focus of their article is the efficient
use of golden parachutes and employment contracts in protecting managers from takeover
risk, Agrawal and Knoeber (1997) also find that CEO compensation is unconditionally
higher at firms with these contracts, which is consistent with an entrenchment effect.
Golden parachutes attached to employment contracts are expected to weaken this
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entrenchment effect by aligning managers' incentives so that they are less likely to resist
takeovers (Lambert and Larcker, 1985). In addition to any entrenchment effects of
employment contracts, the contracts themselves may be a source of litigation or may
proxy for a business risk. Top executive employment contracts (CONTRACT) and
golden parachutes (GOLD_PAR) are measured with dummy variables equal to one if top
executives have employment contracts and golden parachutes, respectively, and zero
otherwise.
The takeover market provides a mechanism for controlling agency problems (e.g.,
Fama and Jensen, 1983), so that takeover deterrents are expected to be associated with
weaker governance. Consistent with takeover deterrents increasing entrenchment,
Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) find that firms that adopt anti-takeover
charter amendments receive fewer takeover bids and pay higher CEO compensation.
Nelson (1999) finds that firms underperform benchmark portfolios after they adopt
poison pills and other takeover deterrents. In addition, the 1993 Wyatt survey reports that
3.5 percent of D&O claims are related to shareholder challenges to takeover defenses.
The existence of takeover defenses may proxy for an increased likelihood of a takeover
bid (Comment and Schwert, 1995) and an increased risk of litigation by shareholders
seeking to remove the takeover deterrents. I measure takeover deterrents (TO_DETER)
as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a poison pill, staggered board, or other
takeover deterrents such as restrictions on ownership by non-Canadians, and zero
otherwise.
3.2

Proxies for business risk
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Firms with higher business risk are expected to have higher premiums, and six
variables are employed as proxies for business risk.
As discussed in Knepper and Bailey (1993), D&O insurers evaluate the quality of
a firm’s management, and firms with higher quality management are hypothesized to
have lower litigation risk. The logarithm of the number of years that the CEO has been on
the board of directors is used as a proxy for management quality (CEO_EXP).20 Provided
that the governance structure variables control for any entrenchment effects that hinder
the removal of a low-quality CEO, the coefficient on CEO_EXP will measure the benefits
of having an experienced CEO, net of any costs of entrenchment. In addition, low
CEO_EXP (because of recent CEO turnover) may also serve as a proxy for poor past
company performance, which is also expected to increase litigation risk.
D&O claims often arise because of poor financial performance (Wyatt, 1993).
The firm's return on equity (ROE) is used as a proxy for financial performance and is
expected to be negatively related to the D&O premium. Larger firms are expected to
have higher litigation risk. The 1993 Wyatt survey indicates that a U.S. company with
over $1 billion in assets is over ten times more likely be sued than a company with under
$100 million in assets. I measure firm size (SIZE) with the logarithm of total assets.
Companies that have disclosed pending or prior litigation (PRIOR_LIT) are
expected to have higher D&O premiums because this litigation may lead to a D&O claim
or because of a negative reputational effect (Romano, 1991). Because of the differences
in the Canadian legal system discussed above, Canadian D&O awards are expected to be
less substantial than U.S. awards. Firms with U.S. operations (US_OPS) or a U.S.
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exchange listing (US_EXCH) are predicted to have greater litigation risk.
4.

Empirical analysis of the D&O premium

4.1

Results
The association between the level of the D&O premium, governance structure

quality, and business risk is examined using the reduced-form equation (6) developed
above in Section 2.2. This regression equation includes as dependent variable
log(premium) and as independent variables the proxies for governance structure quality
and business risk defined in Table 1. Also included as an independent variable is H 2 ,
which is the error term from equation (5), which expresses log(limit) as a function of
governance structure quality and business risk. To estimate equation (6), I conduct a
first-stage regression of log(limit) on the proxies for governance structure quality and
business risk to obtain Hˆ2 , the residual of log(limit). I then estimate the following
second-stage regression:
log(premium)= G0 + G1 governance structure quality + G2 business risk +
(7)
E3 residual of log(limit) + H1
The residual of log(limit) controls for information in log(limit) that is orthogonal to the
other regressors.21 As discussed above, the estimated coefficients Gˆi capture the total
effects of the proxies for governance structure quality and business risk on the D&O
premium.22
The regression model in Panel 1 of Table 2 shows that the governance structure
variables add significant explanatory power to the model for log(premium). The model
has significant explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 76.3%), and all of the governance
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structure variables and business risk variables have the predicted signs. Five of the nine
governance structure variables are significant. A partial F-test (p-value = 0.05) rejects the
hypothesis that the coefficients on all of the governance structure variables are equal to
zero, which means that the variables add a significant amount of explanatory power to the
model for log(premium). The combined evidence on the governance structure variables - their coefficients have the predicted signs, five of the variables are individually
significant, and the variables are collectively significant -- is consistent with the
hypothesis that the D&O premium reflects the quality of the firm’s governance structure.
Place Table 2 Here

The positive and significant coefficient on INS_VOTE is consistent with an
entrenchment effect from insider voting control, and the negative and significant
coefficient on INS_VALUE is consistent with an incentive alignment effect that increases
as insiders hold more of the value of the firm. This result complements research by
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) by highlighting the importance of
the dual role of stock ownership in entrenching and motivating managers. The
insignificant coefficient on OUT_BLOCK is consistent with offsetting effects of outside
shareholders: they simultaneously increase governance structure quality and litigation
risk because they use lawsuits as a substitute monitoring device (Romano, 1991).23 The
coefficient on DIR_OUT is negative, consistent with monitoring benefits of outside
directors. The coefficient on DIR__APP is positive, consistent with governance being
weaker when outside directors are less independent. The coefficient on CONTRACT is
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positive, consistent with the hypothesis that governance structure quality decreases when
managers entrench themselves by obtaining employment contracts.
All of the business risk variables are significant. CEO_EXP has a negative
coefficient, consistent with the hypothesis that firms with more experienced management
are more stable and less risky, after controlling for any entrenchment effects associated
with a CEO of long tenure. ROE has a negative coefficient, indicating that firms with
better operating performance have lower litigation risk. The significant positive
coefficients on SIZE, PRIOR_LIT, US_OPS, and US_EXCH are consistent with my
hypotheses and with economic intuition. Larger firms are more likely to be the subject of
litigation, and U.S. operations or a U.S. exchange listing exposes the firm to the more
costly U.S. litigation environment. The positive coefficient on PRIOR_LIT is consistent
with the findings of Romano (1991), and with the non-mutually exclusive explanations
that D&O insurers are concerned about the spillover effects of pending litigation, that
prior litigation has a negative reputational effect, or that prior litigation may itself be a
manifestation of weak governance.
Finally, the coefficient on the variable residual of log(limit) is significant and
positive, which indicates that information in the limit that is orthogonal to the governance
structure and business risk variables is significantly associated with log(premium).24
Recall that not all firms choose to purchase insurance, and that 26 firms that
purchased insurance had missing premium data (as described in Section 3). Does the
choice to purchase insurance introduce a sample selection bias into the results? To test
for a selection bias, I use the econometric methods developed by Heckman (1979). I
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estimate a probit model for the choice to purchase insurance using all firms, and a
second-stage OLS regression for log(premium) which includes a variable (the inverse
Mills ratio) that corrects for the fact that purchase is predictable. The coefficient on the
inverse Mills ratio in the OLS model for the premium is insignificant, and provides no
evidence consistent with sample-selection bias. Does the missing premium data on 26
firms introduce a selection bias into the results? I estimate a probit model in which the 26
firms with missing data are coded zero, and the 110 firms with full data are coded one.
The probit model indicates that there is no predictable difference between the two sets of
firms (a likelihood ratio test is unable to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on all
of the governance structure and business risk proxies are zero). Because the two sets of
firms are not predictably different, there is by definition no sample selection bias.
To ensure that the results are not driven by outliers, I re-estimate the regression
coefficients using a two-stage weighted least squares procedure developed by Welsch
(1980), which is an efficient way of minimizing the influence of outliers without entirely
discarding the information that they contain.25 The qualitative results are unchanged: the
signs of the coefficient estimates remain the same, the same variables are significant, and
the governance structure variables continue to explain a significant amount of the
variation in the premium.
4.2

Sensitivity tests
The remaining panels of Table 2 present the results of sensitivity tests of the main

model presented in Panel 1. I perform a number of additional tests to ensure that
inference is robust to the potential that the significant positive coefficient on
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CONTRACT reflects a business risk (such as the potential for litigation over the
contracts) instead of, or in addition to, measuring entrenchment and weak governance.26
First, when I classify CONTRACT and GOLD_PAR as business risk variables, the
restriction that the coefficients on the seven remaining governance structure variables are
equal to zero is consistently rejected, as shown by the significant partial F-tests presented
at the bottom of the Table 2. Second, in Panel 2 of Table 2, I present a model in which
CONTRACT and GOLD_PAR are omitted from the regression. Again, a partial F-test
(p-value < 0.10) rejects the restriction that the coefficients on the seven remaining
governance structure variables are equal to zero. Finally, the confirmatory analysis using
CEO compensation described below in Section 4.4 yields the same inference whether or
not CONTRACT and GOLD_PAR are included as measures of governance quality.
I perform a number of sensitivity tests to ensure that omitted variables are not
inducing spurious inference with respect to the governance structure variables. First, in
Panel 3, I include the logarithm of the corporate deductible as an additional regressor.
Although the inclusion of the variable tends to reduce the magnitudes of the coefficient
estimates (particularly on SIZE, US_OPS, and US_EXCH), inference on the governance
structure variables is unaffected. In results not presented in Table 2, log(market value of
equity) is introduced as an additional proxy for business risk. The variable is highly
correlated with SIZE and increases multicollinearity problems in the regression without
improving explanatory power, and its coefficient is not significant. The governance
structure variables continue to be jointly significant in explaining log(premium).
Similarly, if variables measuring leverage, stock return, stock volatility, and growth
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opportunities are included either separately or together in the regression, the variables are
not significant, the governance structure variables are collectively significant, and the
coefficient estimates on the other independent variables are similar to those in Panel 1.
In Panel 4, I include stock volatility and five indicators for high-risk industries.
Prior research (e.g., Alexander, 1991; Jones and Weingram, 1998; Wyatt, 1993) provides
evidence that both stock volatility and industry membership are associated with
shareholder suits. This prior research and an interview with a D&O underwriter suggest
that the following five industries were expected to have higher litigation risk in Canada
and the U.S. during the sample period: technology, media, banking, other financial
institutions, and real estate. While STOCK VOLATILITY is not significant when
included by itself, it is marginally significant when the high-risk industry indicators are
included. However, an F-test (p-value = 0.19) does not reject the restriction that the
coefficients on stock volatility and the five industry indicators are all zero. As shown in
the Panel 4, the inclusion of these variables has no effect on inference with respect to the
governance structure variables.
Panel 5 of Table 2 indicates that the results are robust to the inclusion of twelve
industry dummy variables (the five-high risk industries plus dummy variables for the
remaining major industry groups). The industry effects add no explanatory power to the
model. The governance structure variables continue to be jointly significant in explaining
log(premium), although the coefficients on INS_VALUE and DIR_OUT lose
significance.
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Finally, I perform sensitivity tests related to the inclusion of the multiple class
firms in the sample. Because various elements of a firm's governance structure substitute
for one another, one would expect that the governance structures of multiple class firms
differ from those of single class firms. However, the data no not support the hypothesis
that the governance structure variables of multiple class firms have different effects on
the premium than those of single class firms.27 As a second test, I substitute a single
variable measuring the net of insider percentage voting control over insider percentage
share-ownership for its two components. The coefficient on this net voting control
variable is positive and significant, and the significance levels on the remaining variables
are unaffected. This result provides evidence that the coefficients on INS_VOTE and
INS_VALUE are in fact capturing the net agency costs of insider control of share votes
and insider ownership of share value, and are not merely an artifact of the high correlation
between the two variables. Finally, although the multiple class firms do not differ
significantly in size from the single class firms, there are certain industries in which
multiple class firms are relatively common or uncommon. When industry indicators for
these industries are included in the model in Panel 1, inference on INS_VOTE and
INS_VALUE and the remaining governance variables is unchanged.
4.3

Direct and indirect effects of governance structure quality
I define the variable GOVERNANCE QUALITY as the sum of the governance

structure variables weighted by their estimated coefficients Gˆi shown in Panel 1 of Table
2, multiplied by negative one:

Core 23

GOVERNANCE QUALITY {
-( Gˆ1 inside voting control + . . . + Gˆ9 takeover deterrents)

(8)

This variable is standardized to mean zero and unit variance. Panel 1 of Table 3
illustrates OLS regression results for equation (7) when this variable is substituted for the
nine variables that compose it in a model for the logarithm of the D&O premium. The
coefficient of -0.275 on the standardized variable GOVERNANCE QUALITY indicates
that a firm with corporate governance one standard deviation weaker than average pays a
D&O premium roughly 32 percent more than an otherwise similar firm.
Place Table 3 Here

The reduced-form equation (7) estimated in Panel 1 captures the total effect of
GOVERNANCE QUALITY and the business risk variables on log(premium). For
example, the estimated -0.275 total effect of GOVERNANCE QUALITY on
log(premium) shown in Panel 1 consists of the sum of its direct effect on log(premium)
shown in Panel 2 (-0.210) and its indirect effect on log(premium) through its effect on
log(limit) shown in Panel 3 (0.388*-0.167 = -0.065). The regression coefficients in Panel
2 show the direct effect of a variable on log(premium) in excess of that variable's indirect
effect through log(limit). The significant coefficient on GOVERNANCE QUALITY in
Panel 2 indicates that weaker governance is associated with significantly higher
premiums even after controlling for the indirect effect that weaker governance has on
increasing the limits shown in Panel 3.28
4.4

Confirmatory analysis using excess CEO compensation
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The preceding tests indicate that proxies for governance structure quality add
significant explanatory power to regression models for the D&O premium. These results
suggest that these proxies for governance structure quality are associated with increased
litigation risk, but do not demonstrate that weaker governance structures are worse for
shareholders. In this section, I provide confirmatory evidence that D&O premiums reflect
the quality of firms’ governance structures by demonstrating that measures of weak
governance implied by the D&O premium have a statistically positive relation with
excess CEO compensation.
Recent research finds that CEO compensation in excess of its standard economic
determinants is a proxy for weak corporate governance that makes shareholders worse off
(e.g., Borokovich, Brunarski, and Parrino, 1997; Hallock, 1997; and Core, Holthausen
and Larcker, 1999). If the measure of weak governance implied by the D&O premium is
positively associated with excess CEO compensation, then this result suggests that the
increase in the D&O premium results from an assessment of weaker governance that
makes shareholders worse off (and is not simply an assessment of increased litigation risk
associated with governance structures that allow more managerial discretion).
As a first test of this hypothesis, I specify a linear regression model for the
logarithm of CEO total compensation that includes GOVERNANCE QUALITY (as
defined by equation (8)) and control variables. The control variables for the economic
determinants of CEO pay are: (1) SIZE; (2) the market-to-book assets ratio as a proxy for
the firm’s growth opportunities; (3) firm performance (stock return and ROE); and (4) the
expected difference in CEO compensation for CEOs more exposed to the U.S. labor
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market (US_OPS and US_EXCH).29 This empirical model for CEO compensation is
similar to extensions of the Smith and Watts (1992) demand-side model for CEO
compensation employed by Agrawal and Knoeber (1997) and Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999).
The sample used is 208 firms with CEO compensation data obtained by deleting
30 firms with missing compensation data and 8 firms with missing independent variables
from the initial sample of 246 firms described above.30 Total CEO compensation is the
sum of base salary, annual incentive payments, the value of option grants and grants
under long-term incentive plans, and the value of any benefits and perquisites.31 This
data is gathered from the proxy statement. Table 4 contains definitions and descriptive
statistics for the variables.
Place Table 4 Here

GOVERNANCE QUALITY in Model 1 of Table 5 has a highly significant
negative coefficient, and indicates that excess pay is higher when governance is weaker.
This result provides evidence that the governance structure variables underlying
GOVERNANCE QUALITY in fact proxy for the quality of the firm’s governance
structure. The coefficient on the standardized variable GOVERNANCE QUALITY
indicates that a CEO at a firm with corporate governance one standard deviation weaker
than average earns roughly 26 percent more than the CEO of an otherwise similar firm.
With the exception of US_OPS, the coefficients on the control variables have the
predicted signs and are consistent with the findings of prior research (e.g., Smith and
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Watts, 1992) on the association between firm size, growth opportunities, performance and
CEO compensation.
Place Table 5 Here

The regression model in Panel 2 of Table 5 includes the interactive variable
(GOVERNANCE QUALITY) X (firm has insurance), which is equal to GOVERNANCE
QUALITY if the firm has D&O insurance, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on this
interactive variable is insignificant while the coefficient on GOVERNANCE QUALITY
remains negative and significant. This evidence is not consistent with GOVERNANCE
QUALITY proxying for some risk for which CEOs must receive higher compensation. If
GOVERNANCE QUALITY were a risk factor in CEO compensation, one would expect
that CEOs with D&O insurance would receive lower compensation for the risk, i.e., that
the coefficient on the interactive variable would be positive and significant. Instead, the
insignificant coefficient on the interactive term provides additional evidence that the
governance structure variables underlying GOVERNANCE QUALITY proxy for the
quality of the firm’s governance structure.32
As a more direct test of the hypothesis that D&O premiums reflect weak
governance, I use as a proxy for weak governance the residual premium unexplained by
the business risk variables and log(limit). PREMIUM RESIDUAL is obtained by
excluding all of the governance structure variables in the estimation of equation (7) for
log(premium), and is equivalent to the following regression:33
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log(premium) = E0 + E2 business risk + E3 log(limit) + H3

(9)

Because the governance structure proxy variables are omitted from the regression,
PREMIUM RESIDUAL captures any amount of the premium that is related to the firm's
governance structure. PREMIUM RESIDUAL can be computed for all of the 110 firms
with D&O premiums, but only 97 of these firms have data available for the analysis of
CEO compensation. PREMIUM RESIDUAL has a significant positive correlation (0.34)
with GOVERNANCE QUALITY. The final panel of Table 5 illustrates that PREMIUM
RESIDUAL has a significant positive association with excess CEO pay, and provides
additional confirmatory evidence that the D&O premium is higher when governance is
weaker.34
5.

Conclusion
Using a sample of D&O premiums gathered from the proxy statements of

Canadian companies, this article documents that there is detectable variation in D&O
premiums that is related to variables that proxy for the quality of firms' governance. The
association between these variables and higher D&O premiums is robust to a number of
alternative specifications. I provide confirmatory evidence that the D&O premium
reflects the quality of the firm's corporate governance by showing that measures of weak
governance implied by the D&O premium are positively related to excess CEO
compensation. Combined with the findings of previous research that has found an
association between weak governance and excess CEO compensation, this finding
provides indirect evidence that D&O insurers charge higher premiums when firms have
governance structures that make shareholders worse off.
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There is growing consensus inside and outside academics that weak governance is
costly to outside shareholders. However, it is difficult and costly for shareholders to
assess the quality of firms' governance. As a result, in the United States, institutional
shareholders buy ratings of firms' corporate governance from outside specialists such as
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS relies on publicly-available data, and has no
comparative advantage in creating its ratings other than its data processing capabilities.
The results in this article indicate that another outsider, the D&O insurer, is already
making this assessment, and is in fact being provided non-public data by firms to make
this assessment. Excess D&O premiums contain information about the quality of firms'
governance. Unlike the Ontario Securities Commission, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission does not require that U.S. firms disclose anything about their
D&O insurance to their shareholders. The direct evidence in this article suggests that
U.S. shareholders would find the independent assessment contained in these premiums to
be a useful summary of the likelihood of litigation associated with firms' governance
structures. The indirect evidence in this article suggests that this piece of summary
information would also provide an additional tool for assessing the relative effectiveness
of firms' governance structures in maximizing returns to outside shareholders.

Core 29

References
Agrawal, Anup and Charles R. Knoeber. 1997. "Managerial Compensation and the Threat
of Takeover," 47 Journal of Financial Economics 219-239.
Alboini, Victor P. 1993. Securities Law and Practice, Release No. 5. Toronto, Canada:
Carswell.
Alexander, Janet Cooper. 1991. "Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions," 43 Stanford Law Review 497-598.
Baillie, James C. 1996. "Comments of a Business Lawyer on Rules Governing Boards of
Canadian Corporations," 28 Canadian Business Law Journal 127-139.
Beauschesne, Eric. 1994. "U.S. CEOs Earn Double Wages of Canadian Counterparts,"
The Ottawa Citizen C3 (Jan. 18).
Belsley, David A., Edwin Kuh, and Roy E. Welsch. 1980. Regression Diagnostics:
Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: John Wiley &
Sons.
Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino. 1997. "CEO
Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments," 52 Journal of Finance 1495-1517.
Brickley, James A., Jeffrey L. Coles, and Gregg Jarrell. 1997. "Leadership structure:
Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," 3 Journal Of Corporate Finance
189-220.
Clarkson, Peter M., and Dan A. Simunic. 1994. "The Association between Audit Quality,
Retained Ownership, and Firm-Specific Risk in U.S. vs. Canadian IPO markets,"
17 Journal of Accounting and Economics 207-228.
Comment, Robert, and G. William Schwert. 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures," 39 Journal of
Financial Economics 3-43.
Core, John E. 1997. "On the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance,"
64 The Journal of Risk and Insurance 63-87.
______, Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. 1999. "Corporate Governance,
Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance," 51 Journal of
Financial Economics 371-406.

Core 30

Cox, John C., Stephen A. Ross, and Mark Rubinstein. 1979. "Option Pricing: A
Simplified Approach," 7 Journal of Financial Economics 229-63.
Cummins, J. D. 1991. "Statistical and Financial Models of Insurance Pricing and the
Insurance Firm," 58 Journal of Risk and Insurance 261-302.
D'Arcy, Stephen P. et al. 1990. Foundations of Casualty Actuarial Science. Arlington,
VA: Casualty Actuarial Society.
Daniels, Ronald J. and Susan M., Hutton. 1993. "The Capricious Cushion: The
Implications of the Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian
Corporate Governance," 22 Canadian Business Law Journal 182-230.
Dechow, Patricia M., Richard G. Sloan, and Amy P. Sweeney. 1996. "Causes and
Consequences of Earnings Manipulations : An Analysis of Firms Subject to
Enforcement Actions by the SEC," 13 Contemporary Accounting Research 1-36.
Demsetz, Harold. 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," 26
Journal of Law and Economics 375-393.
Doyle, Corbette S. 1991. "Bargaining on D&O Coverage," The Corporate Board Special
Report 13-17 (July/August).
Eckbo, B. Epsen and Savita Verma. 1994. "Managerial Ownership, Voting Power and
Cash Dividend Policy," 1 Journal of Corporate Finance 33-62.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control,"
26 Journal of Law and Economics 301-325.
Hallock, Kevin F. 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive
Compensation," 32 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 331-344.
Heckman, James. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," 47
Econometrica 153-61.
Holderness, Clifford G. 1990. "Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors," 10 International
Review of Law and Economics 115-129.
Jensen, Michael C. 1993. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems," 48 Journal of Finance 831-880.

Core 31

______ and William Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure," 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360.
Jones, Christopher L. and Seth E. Weingram. 1998. "Why 10b-5 Litigation Risk is Higher
for Technology and Financial Services Firms," Working paper, George
Washington University.
Knepper, William E. and Dan A. Bailey. 1993. Liability of Corporate Officers and
Directors. Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny.
1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," 52 Journal of Finance 11311150.
Lambert, Richard A. and David Larcker. 1985. "Golden Parachutes, Executive DecisionMaking and Shareholder Wealth," 7 Journal of Accounting and Economics 179203.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1988. "Management Ownership
and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis," 20 Journal of Financial
Economics 293-315.
Nelson, James 1999. "Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance: An
Examination of an Endogenous Relationship," Working paper, University of
Arizona.
Parry, Mark E. and Arthur E. Parry. 1991. "The Purchase of Insurance by a Risk-Neutral
Firm for a Risk-Averse Agent," 58 Journal of Risk and Insurance 31-46.
Rao, S. R. and C.R. Lee-Sing. 1995. "Governance Structure, Corporate Decision-Making
and Firm Performance in North America," in R. J. Daniels and R. Morck, eds.,
Corporate Decision-Making in Canada. Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary
Press.
Romano, Roberta. 1991. "The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?" 7 The
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 55-87.
Rousseau, Stephane. 1997. "Review of Corporate Decision-Making in Canada, ed.
Daniels, R. J., Morck, R. (University of Calgary Press, 1995)," 28 Canadian
Business Law Journal 310-320.
Rowley, J. William. 1996. "Toronto Stock Exchange Seeks Improved Disclosure," 52
International Financial Law Review 45-47 (May).

Core 32

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," 52
Journal of Finance 737-783.
______ and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," 94
Journal of Political Economy 461-488.
Smith, Clifford W., and Ross L. Watts. 1992. "The Investment Opportunity Set and
Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies," 32 Journal of
Financial Economics 263-92.
Stulz, Rene M. 1988. "Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the
Market for Corporate Control," 20 Journal of Financial Economics 25-45.
Trebilcock, Michael J. 1987. "The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis," 24
San Diego Law Review 929-1002.
Wade, James, Charles A. O'Reilly, and Ike Chandratat. 1990. "Golden Parachutes: CEOs
and the Exercise of Social Influence," 35 Administrative Science Quarterly 587603.
Weisbach, Michael S. 1988. "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover," 20 Journal of
Financial Economics 421-60.
Welsch, Roy E. 1980. "Regression Sensitivity Analysis and Bounded-Influence
Estimation," in J. Kmenta and J. B. Ramsay, eds., Evaluation of Econometric
Models. New York: Academic Press.
The Wyatt Company. 1993. Directors and Officers Liability Survey. Chicago, IL: Wyatt
Company.
Zingales, Luigi. 1998. "Corporate Governance," in P. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave
Dictionary Of Economics And The Law. New York: Stockton Press.

Core 33
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the D&O Premium and its Hypothesized Determinants
The sample consists of 110 observations. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year or for the fiscal year ending
prior to the year of purchase of D&O insurance. Dollar amounts are in Canadian dollars.
D&O Insurance Variables
Variable
D&O premium
Log(premium)
D&O limit
log(limit)

Variable Definition
Dollar amount of the annual D&O
insurance premium
Logarithm of the premium for D&O
insurance
Annual coverage limit
Logarithm of the limit for D&O insurance

Predicted
Sign

+

Mean
167,780

Median
103,477

Std Dev.
188,223

11.556

11.547

0.966

26,431,545 20,000,000 24,548,990
16.788
16.811
0.765

Governance Structure Variables
Variable
INS_VOTE
INS_VALUE
OUT_BLOCK
DIR_OUT
DIR_APP
CEO_COB
CONTRACT
GOLD_PAR
TO_DETER

Variable Definition
Percentage of share votes controlled by
inside directors
Percentage of share value owned by inside
directors
= 1 when an outside blockholder owns over
10% of the stock
Number of outside directors as a percentage
of the total number of directors
Percentage of outside directors who were
appointed since the CEO joined the board
= 1 if the CEO is also board chair
= 1 if the CEO or any other top executive
has employment contract
= 1 if the CEO or any other top executive
has a golden parachute
= 1 if the firm has a staggered board, poison
pill, or any other takeover restrictions

Predicted
Sign
+

Mean
17.1%

Median
0.1%

Std Dev.
28.4%

-

8.1%

0.1%

14.4%

-

0.555

1.000

0.499

-

71.0%

77.4%

18.9%

+

63.3%

73.9%

36.7%

+
+

0.536
0.518

1.000
1.000

0.501
0.502

-

0.282

0.000

0.452

+

0.255

0.000

0.438

Business Risk Variables
Variable
CEO_EXP
ROE
SIZE
PRIOR_LIT
US_OPS
US_EXCH

Variable Definition
Logarithm of the number of years the CEO
has served on the board of directors
net income before extraordinary items
divided by ending equity
logarithm of total assets
= 1 if the firm disclosed pending or prior
litigation in either its annual report or proxy
= 1 if the firm has sales or assets in the U.S.
=1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. exchange

Predicted
Sign
-

Mean
1.925

Median
2.013

Std Dev.
0.993

-

-2.9%

2.9%

23.6%

+
+

20.603
0.536

20.515
1.000

1.698
0.501

+
+

0.727
0.327

1.000
0.000

0.447
0.471
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Table 2. Regressions of the logarithm of the D&O premium
The sample consists of 110 observations. The residual of log(limit) is the residual from a regression of log(limit) on the
governance structure quality and business risk variables. All other variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (based on
OLS standard errors) appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Independent
Predicted
Variable
Sign
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
INS_VOTE
+
0.646**
0.602**
0.571*
0.598*
0.603*
(2.18)
(2.01)
(1.98)
(1.98)
(1.93)
INS_VALUE
-0.958*
-0.988*
-0.906*
-0.950*
-0.856
(-1.79)
(-1.81)
(-1.74)
(-1.72)
(-1.51)
OUT_BLOCK
-0.020
0.023
0.034
-0.037
-0.071
(-0.19)
(0.23)
(0.35)
(-0.33)
(-0.57)
DIR_OUT
-0.559*
-0.486
-0.563*
-0.588*
-0.435
(-1.67)
(-1.46)
(-1.73)
(-1.68)
(-1.21)
DIR_APP
+
0.390**
0.365*
0.372**
0.396**
0.444**
(2.05)
(1.90)
(2.01)
(2.09)
(2.13)
CEO_COB
+
0.086
0.050
0.077
0.121
0.121
(0.77)
(0.44)
(0.70)
(1.04)
(0.99)
CONTRACT
+
0.350***
0.334***
0.391***
0.422***
(2.81)
(2.75)
(3.00)
(2.97)
GOLD_PAR
-0.103
-0.104
-0.130
-0.087
(-0.76)
(-0.80)
(-0.96)
(-0.59)
TO_DETER
+
0.146
0.143
0.139
0.112
0.025
(1.25)
(1.22)
(1.23)
(0.91)
(0.19)
CEO_EXP
-0.298***
-0.298***
-0.282***
-0.292***
-0.304***
(-3.86)
(-3.78)
(-3.74)
(-3.79)
(-3.85)
ROE
-0.580***
-0.697**
-0.528**
-0.440*
-0.810***
(-2.78)
(-3.36)
(-2.59)
(-1.94)
(-3.0)
SIZE
+
0.419***
0.419***
0.361***
0.484***
0.468***
(13.52)
(13.26)
(9.61)
(11.36)
(11.04)
PRIOR_LIT
+
0.233**
0.245**
0.221**
0.212**
0.283***
(2.39)
(2.47)
(2.33)
(2.11)
(2.80)
US_OPS
+
0.285**
0.272**
0.229**
0.291**
0.290**
(2.62)
(2.47)
(2.12)
(2.60)
(2.29)
US_EXCH
+
0.304***
0.339***
0.233**
0.224**
0.200
(2.92)
(3.24)
(2.22)
(2.00)
(1.62)
Residual of log(limit)
+
0.439***
0.462***
0.402***
0.502***
0.481***
(5.03)
(5.24)
(4.68)
(5.12)
(4.86)
log(corporate deductible)
?
0.133**
(2.55)
Stock Volatility
+
0.438
(1.62)

Industry Effects
NO
Adjusted-R2
76.3%
F-test for the restriction that the coefficients on
all of the governance structure variables are 0
2.55**
F-test for the restriction that the coefficients on
all of the governance structure variables except
for CONTRACT and GOLD_PAR are 0
2.39**
***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level (two-tail).

NO
75.3%

NO
77.6%

HighRisk35
77.0%

All
76.7%

1.86*

2.35**

2.67***

2.56**

1.86*

2.20**

2.48**

2.29**
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Table 3. Regressions of the logarithm of the D&O premium and the logarithm of the limit
Panel 1 illustrates the total effect of the variable on log(premium), which is the sum of the direct effect of the variable on
log(premium) shown in Panel 2 and its indirect effect on log(premium) through its effect on log(limit) shown in Panel 3. The
sample consists of 110 observations. GOVERNANCE QUALITY is the linear composite of the governance structure
variables defined by equation (8), and is standardized to mean zero and unit variance. The residual of log(limit) is the residual
from the regression of log(limit) shown in Panel 3. All other variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (based on OLS
standard errors) appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Dependent Variable
log
log
log
Independent
Predicted
(premium)
(premium)
(limit)
Variable
Sign
(1)
(2)
(3)
GOVERNANCE QUALITY
-0.275***
-0.210***
-0.167**
(-4.92)
(-3.65)
(-2.42)
CEO_EXP
-0.298***
-0.215***
-0.212***
(-5.09)
(-3.53)
(-2.93)
ROE
-0.580***
-0.473**
-0.275
(-2.96)
(-2.40)
(-1.13)
SIZE
+
0.419***
0.323***
0.248***
(15.66)
(9.69)
(7.49)
PRIOR_LIT
+
0.233**
0.207**
0.068
(2.50)
(2.22)
(0.59)
US_OPS
+
0.285***
0.190*
0.244*
(2.75)
(1.81)
(1.91)
US_EXCH
+
0.304***
0.138
0.426***
(3.09)
(1.33)
(3.51)
log(limit)
+
0.388***
(4.85)
Residual log(limit)
+
0.388***
from Panel 3
(4.85)
Adjusted-R2
F

77.5%
47.87***

***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level (two-tail).

77.5%
47.87***

45.1%
13.78***
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for CEO Compensation and its Hypothesized Determinants
The sample consists of 208 observations. With the exception of RETURN and ROE, which are measured in the fiscal year
during which CEO compensation is earned, all other variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year or for the fiscal year
ending prior to the year during which CEO compensation is earned. Dollar amounts are in Canadian dollars.
CEO Compensation
Variable
Total compensation

log(Total
compensation)

Variable Definition
Total of: (1) base salary; (2) annual
incentive payments; (3) the estimated value
of option grants and grants under long-term
incentive plans; plus (4) the cash value of
any benefits and perquisites.
Logarithm of total compensation

Mean
1,086,739

Median
656,916

Std Dev
1,283,698

13.524

13.395

0.811

Predicted
Sign
-

Mean
0.000

Median
0.028

Std Dev
1.000

+
+

20.521
1.406

20.462
1.117

1.749
0.934

+
+

52.6%
-3.6%

33.1%
5.8%

79.0%
40.2%

+
+

0.298
0.697

0.000
1.000

0.459
0.461

Explanatory Variables
Variable
GOVERNANCE
QUALITY
SIZE
GROWTH_OPP
RETURN
ROE
US_EXCH
US_OPS

Variable Definition
Standardized linear composite of the
governance structure quality variables
defined by equation (8)
Logarithm of total assets
Market value of the firm’s equity plus the
book value of the firm’s liabilities, divided
by total assets
Percentage annual stock return
Net income before extraordinary items
divided by ending equity
= 1 if the firm is listed on a U. S. exchange
= 1 if the firm has sales or assets in the U.S.
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Table 5. Regressions of the logarithm of CEO compensation
GOVERNANCE QUALITY is the linear composite of the governance structure variables defined by equation (8), and is
standardized to mean zero and unit variance. (GOVERNANCE QUALITY) X (firm has insurance) is an interactive variable
equal to GOVERNANCE QUALITY if the firm has D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise. PREMIUM RESIDUAL is the
residual from the regression equation (9), which excludes the governance structure variables. PREMIUM RESIDUAL is
standardized to mean zero and unit variance. Other variables are defined in Table 4. T-statistics (based on OLS standard
errors) appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Independent
Variable
GOVERNANCE QUALITY

Predicted
Sign
-

(GOVERNANCE QUALITY) X
(firm has insurance)
PREMIUM RESIDUAL

+

SIZE

+

GROWTH_OPP

+

RETURN

+

ROE

+

US_EXCH

+

US_OPS

+

(1)
-0.231***
(-4.80)

?

adj-R2
F
Sample Size

***, **, * significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level (two-tail).

(2)
-0.152*
(-1.87)
-0.123
(-1.22)

(3)

0.253***
(8.29)
0.102*
(1.84)
0.190***
(3.01)
0.078
(0.66)
0.202*
(1.88)
-0.074
(-0.69)

0.248***
(8.08)
0.110*
(1.97)
0.192***
(3.02)
0.097
(0.81)
0.212*
(1.97)
-0.064
(-0.59)

0.127*
(1.75)
0.211***
(4.48)
0.264***
(2.86)
0.122
(1.53)
0.084
(0.58)
0.010
(0.06)
-0.117
(-0.67)

30.2%
13.78***
208

29.5%
11.77***
207 36

18.7%
4.16***
97
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Endnotes
1

This definition blends more traditional definitions of corporate governance quality (from

the perspective of minimizing agency costs to outside shareholders) employed by, for
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) with the definition of governance as a set of
constraints defined broadly by Zingales (1998) and operationalized in the case of
shareholders and managers by Nelson (1999). Note that my definition does not
necessarily imply that weak governance is bad for shareholders. As a counterexample,
shareholders may maximize share value by giving a talented manager loose constraints,
and then suing when that manager makes bad choices.
2

Overall, the legal systems in the two countries are quite similar in their legal protection

of investors (La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997) and in regard to
D&O claims (Daniels and Hutton, 1993).
Historically, the Canadian system is less expensive and less conducive to nuisance
suits because in Canada, tort cases are typically settled by a judge alone; the contingent
fee system is used less frequently and contingency fees are subject to a reasonableness
standard; the loser pays part of the winner's legal expenses; punitive damages are rarely
granted; and class actions and derivative actions are less frequent (Trebilcock,1987;
Daniels and Hutton, 1993; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994).
However, Canadian legal practices have a tendency to converge toward U.S.
practices (Baillie, 1996). Particular areas of such convergence of include: (1) changes
beginning in 1992 expanding class action litigation; (2) the requirement in 1993 of U.S.-
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style proxy disclosure of executive pay; (3) the requirement in 1995 that firms disclose
their compliance with a set of governance principles (Rousseau, 1997); and (4)
consideration to increase D&O liability for inadequate or misleading disclosure (Rowley,
1996).
3

Source: The Wyatt Company, 1993 Directors and Officers Liability Survey (U.S.

participants only) and 1989 Wyatt Canadian Directors and Officers Liability Survey
(cited in Daniels and Hutton, 1993, p. 190). The Wyatt Company conducts an annual
survey of D&O claims in the U.S., and is recognized as the sole public source of
information on this insurance. The Wyatt Company discontinued its Canadian survey in
1991.
4

Although corporate law in Canada and in the U.S. permits firms to indemnify their

directors and officers against most claims, certain claims by law may not be indemnified
(e.g., shareholder derivative suits in which shareholders sue D&Os on behalf of the firm).
In addition, the firm may be unable to provide indemnification because of financial
distress, and new managers may be unwilling to indemnify old managers following a
change-in-control. Parry and Parry (1991) suggest that a principal purpose of D&O
insurance is to protect officers and directors when indemnification is not available.
5

For example, suppose a firm carries a policy with an annual limit of $15 million. In the

event that two groups of D&Os were each to suffer $10 million in covered losses in the
policy year, the first group of D&Os to make a claim would receive $10 million in
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reimbursement (less any deductible) and the second group would receive the remainder of
the limit, $5 million, for the second claim.
6

An exception to the symmetric information assumption occurs in the unusual

circumstance when one of the D&Os intentionally misrepresents a known risk of suit on
the policy application or policy renewal form. Canadian law permits the insurer to revoke
the policy entirely under such a circumstance. In contrast, U.S. law allows the insurer to
deny coverage to the D&O(s) who intentionally lied, but requires that the insurer provide
coverage to the innocent D&Os. These differences in law suggest another reason that
litigation risk will be higher for firms with U.S. exchange listings. The inclusion of
fraudulent financial statements in the policy application or renewal form is the most
frequent example of an intentional misrepresentation. Given previously-documented
links between financial statement fraud and weak governance (e.g. Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney, 1996), the hypothesized increase in the premium related to weak governance
may also reflect the insurer's assessment of an increased probability of the firm's
withholding adverse information when it has weaker governance.
7

If firms' governance structures are continuously optimized, governance structure and

business risk are jointly determined functions of a small number of firm-specific variables
(e.g., Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983; and Smith and Watts, 1992). However,
recent evidence suggests that transactions costs allow sub-optimal governance structures
to persist (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The D&O premium regressions test whether
there is information in the governance structure variables incremental to the business risk
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control variables, and whether the coefficients on the governance structure variables are
consistent with the interpretation that weaker governance increases litigation risk.
8

At least ten insurers were underwriting primary coverage for Canadian-only risks, but a

large Canadian firm could purchase D&O insurance from another thirty to forty firms
underwriting in the U.S. and worldwide (Source: interviews with a Canadian D&O
broker and a Canadian D&O underwriter).
9

See Cummins (1991) for a discussion of symmetric information insurance contracting

and D'Arcy et al. (1990) for a discussion of insurance ratemating.
10

The use of log(limit) as a proxy for the expected loss omits information in the

deductible that may affect the premium. Sensitivity analysis described in Section 4.2
indicates that the results are unaffected by the omission of the deductible. In addition, I
obtain qualitatively the same results if I use a first-stage factor-analytic method that forms
a proxy for the logarithm of the expected loss as a weighted sum of the logarithms of the
limit and deductible, their squares, and their cross-product (a translog approximation).
11

The cost-minimizing choice of the limit involves a trade-off of the marginal cost of the

extra limit (charged by the risk-neutral insurer) versus the marginal benefit of reducing
the risk-averse D&O's risk-premium. Because it is not possible for an individual director
to buy coverage (Parry and Parry, 1991; interviews with D&O underwriters), it is cheaper
for the firm to buy insurance rather than to increase the D&O's compensation. The
D&O's risk-premium increases with litigation risk faster than the insurance premium
(Holderness, 1990). Therefore, the net benefits of purchasing a higher limit increase in
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the firm's litigation risk, and it is not necessary to control for the marginal cost of the
insurance.
12

This assumption appears to be contradicted by Holderness (1990), who states that

"sometimes the issuance of a policy is predicated on specific organizational changes" (p.
119). However, Holderness was describing the non-competitive market of the D&O
crisis years of the late 1980s, when severe capacity constraints gave insurers the market
power to act as oligopolists. When the D&O market is competitive (as it was during the
sample period), policies are readily available from a number of insurers, premiums are
relatively low, and firm managers prefer to pay for the extra risk rather than make a costly
change to governance.
13

This sample was obtained by mailing a request (and follow-up request) for proxy

statements and annual reports to each of the 375 publicly-traded Canadian companies
listed on the Compact Disclosure Worldscope.
14

Some firms disclosed only the premium paid for the corporate coverage or the personal

coverage portion of their D&O policies. This partial premium is not comparable to a
premium paid for both portions of the D&O insurance policy. Firms whose insurance is
provided by their parents are dropped because the cost allocation of the premium to the
subsidiary is made by the parent, and is arbitrary.
15

For those firms that report in U.S. dollars, amounts have been converted to Canadian

dollars using a monthly series of the spot exchange rate (obtained from the Datastream
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service). To make a rough conversion of Canadian dollars into U.S. dollars, multiply the
Canadian dollar figure by 0.8.
16

Canadian proxy disclosure only requires ownership information for inside officers who

are also directors, in contrast to U.S. disclosure of ownership for both officers and
directors.
17

The disclosure threshold for blockholders of a Canadian-listed company is control of

10% of a class of stock (as compared to 5% for a U.S. company).
18

While the governance literature consistently predicts a negative association between

governance quality and a dual CEO/board chair and positive association between
governance quality and the proportion of outside directors, the evidence is mixed (e.g.,
Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999).
19

Consistent with Weisbach (1988), I define outside directors as non-inside, non-gray

directors. An inside director is a director who is a manager, retired manager, or relative
of a manager. A non-inside director is considered gray if he or his employer receives
payments from the firm in excess of his board pay.
20

Canadian proxy statements provide much less biographical data than U.S. proxy

statements. The number of years the CEO has held his position or the number of other
boards on which the CEO serves is usually not disclosed, so that it is not possible to
create proxies for CEO quality based on these variables.
21

Part of this information arises because the limits are sold in discrete multiples of five

million dollars (typically). Thus, even if the firm's desired limit were completely
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determined by the proxies for litigation risk, because of the discreteness in the actual
limit, there will be information in the residual limit that will be associated with the
premium.
22

The total effect is the sum of the variable's direct effect on log(premium) and its

indirect effect on log(premium) through its effect on the amount of coverage purchased,
log(limit). Section 4.3 illustrates that governance structure quality has a significant direct
and indirect effect on log(premium).
23

Inference is unaffected if OUT_BLOCK is dropped from the regression.

24

If the residual of log(limit) is omitted as an explanatory variable from the reduced-

form model, the adjusted R2 falls to 70.7%, the coefficients on the remaining variables
are the same, but their standard errors increase by approximately 12%. Although
significance levels are reduced, a partial F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients
on all of the governance structure variables are equal to zero (p-value = 0.05).
25

Instead of being deleted in the second-stage regression, leveraged outliers, as measured

by the DFFITs criterion (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980), are downweighted.
26

A stepwise multivariate logit model indicates that inside voting control is negatively

associated with contracts (which is consistent with contracts being a substitute for voting
control as an entrenchment device), and that a US exchange listing is positively
associated with contracts (which is consistent with contracts proxying for a business risk).
In the CEO pay regressions discussed below, contracts are associated with higher CEO
pay, which is consistent with an interpretation of entrenchment (e.g., Borokovich,
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Brunarski, and Parrino, 1997), or consistent with the contracts proxying for an omitted
determinant of CEO pay (e.g., CEO quality if the Smith and Watts (1992) proxies do not
entirely capture the firm's demand for a high-quality CEO).
27

To test this hypothesis, I estimate a regression model in which there are different

coefficients on each the governance structure variables (other than INS_VOTE) for the
multiple class firms and for the single class firms. An F-test does not reject the restriction
that the coefficients are equal on each the governance structure variables, providing no
evidence of differing effects for the two groups of firms.
28

Because log(limit) is a function of the both the firm's governance structure and

business risk, the regressions in Panels 1 and 2 have the same adjusted-R2, and log(limit)
and residual of log(limit) have identical coefficients.
29

A Towers Perrin study quoted by Beauchesne (1994) indicates that a CEO of a

Canadian firm with U.S.$250 mm in sales earned U.S.$404,000 while a CEO of the
same-sized U.S. company earned U.S.$777,000.
30

Canadian firms with fiscal years ending before October 31, 1993 were not required to

disclose disaggregated compensation data for individual executives, and for this reason
CEO compensation data was missing for 27 firms.
31

Stock options are valued with a 200-node Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) binomial

model that values the impact of optimal early exercise. Long-term incentive grants are
valued assuming target performance is achieved.
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32

The inference from Table 5 is not affected if CONTRACT and GOLD_PAR are

excluded from the measure GOVERNANCE QUALITY.
33

Recall that, by construction, the residuals in equations (4) and (7) are the same.

34

The results for CEO compensation presented in Table 5 are robust to alternative

specifications. Inference is unchanged if twelve industry dummy variables are included
in the regressions or if log(cash compensation) is used instead to proxy for CEO
compensation. Inference is also unchanged if leveraged outliers are downweighted using
the Welsch (1980) procedure described above.
35

The high-risk industries are technology, media, banking, other financial institutions,

and real estate. All industries includes another seven dummy variables for the remaining
industry groups.
36

Excluded from this regression is one firm which stated the intention to purchase D&O

insurance, but disclosed no coverage, as it is unclear whether this firm should be
classified as having insurance or not.

